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Historicizing Hermann von Helmholtz’s Psychology
of Diﬀerentiation
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Nineteenth-century scientist Hermann von Helmholtz’s pecu-
liar wavering between empiricism and transcendentalism in his
philosophy of science in general, and in his theory of perception
in particular, is a much debated and well-documented topic in
the history and philosophy of science. This contribution aims
at providing a fresh angle on this classical issue, by consider-
ingHelmholtz’s account of diﬀerential consciousness against the
background of a centuries-old philosophical debate between the
(strict) empiricist tradition and the tradition of transcendental
idealism. By placing Helmholtz’s psychology against the back-
ground of a historical narrative stretching fromHume to Fichte,
one can gain insight into the possible merits of his empirico-
transcendentalismwith regard to the problem of diﬀerentiation.
Moreparticularly, it is argued thatHelmholtz’s psychology tilted
towards transcendentalismwhenmet with the classical theoret-
ical problems of strict empiricism in dealingwith the foundation
of consciousness, most notably circularity and inﬁnite regress.
Without claiming that Helmholtz’s theorizing presented a self-
conscious attempt to overcome the latter issues, his well-known
wavering between perspectives in general, and his appropria-
tion of the a priori in particular, might have served him well
in avoiding the deadlocks of empiricism. As noted at the end,
however, Helmholtz’s account produced complex philosophical
problems of its own.
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Nineteenth-century scientist Hermann von Helmholtz’s pecu-
liar wavering between empiricism and transcendentalism in his
philosophy of science in general, and his theory of perception
in particular, is a much debated and well-documented topic in
the history and philosophy of science.1 This contribution aims
at providing a fresh angle on this classical issue, by consid-
ering Helmholtz’s account of differential consciousness—i.e., his
answer to the question as to what ﬁrst enables a “distinction
between thought and reality [Scheidung von Gedachtem undWirk-
lichem]” in perception—against the background of a century-old
philosophical debate between the (strict) empiricist tradition
and the tradition of transcendental idealism (Helmholtz 1878,
242). As will soon be clear, this historical framework provides
an interesting interpretive tool in getting a ﬁrmer grasp of the
systematic purport of Helmholtz’s empirico-transcendentalism,
speciﬁcally with regard to the problem of accounting for the
diﬀerential awareness of self and world that is presupposed in
every act of perception.
Although the main goal of this paper is thus systematic in
nature, it is structured in accordancewith the historical chronol-
ogy of the authors discussed. First, an analysis is presented of
the way in which Hume’s inability properly to address issues
1For Helmholtz’s indebtedness to Kant’s philosophy, see for example
Krause (1878), Schwertschlager (1883), Goldschmidt (1898), Hatﬁeld (1990),
Cahan (1993), and Schiemann (2009). Also see De Kock (2014a, 2014b, 2016).
pertaining to the subject and self-consciousness created insur-
mountable problems with respect to the problem of diﬀeren-
tiation in experience. As such, we will be dealing with what
William James once identiﬁed as strict empiricism’s “lurking
bad conscience about the self” and the shyness “about openly
tackling the problem of how it [the Self] comes to be aware of
itself” (James 1890, 354). In doing so, the problem of subjectivity
is not considered in its own right, but only to the extent that it
is related to the problem of diﬀerentiation. Second, the works of
Kant and Fichte will be reviewed (see Section 2) in light of their
potential to provide an antidote to the pitfalls of Hume’s strict
empiricist framework in trying to found object experience. Sub-
sequently, Mill’s neo-Humean Psychological Theory of the Belief in
an External World is outlined, as well as the way in which it re-
produced the problems inherent to Hume’s empiricism (Section
3). Finally, the systematic purport of Helmholtz’s move beyond
the strict empiricist framework and his subsequent alignment
with the transcendental tradition with regard to the problem of
diﬀerential consciousness are discussed in light of this histori-
cal framework (Section 4). In addition to exploring the possible
enlightening eﬀects of historicizing the peculiar entanglement
of philosophical traditions in Helmholtz’s account of diﬀeren-
tial consciousness, the analysis presented below also provides
a good occasion to ﬂesh out Helmholtz’s intellectual relation to
John Stuart Mill.2 In contrast to Helmholtz’s notoriously com-
plex attitude towards Kant’s philosophy, his indebtedness to
Mill has often been taken for granted, but is rarely studied in de-
tail. Furthermore, the analysis presented poignantly illustrates
the epistemological and methodological discussions that came
up in the development of a scientiﬁc program of psychology.
2Although Helmholtz indeed professed his indebtedness to Mill’s System
of Logic (see below), Boring (1950) and Hochberg (2007), for example, have
gone as far as assimilating Helmholtz’s and Mill’s views on perception (see
section 4). Most scholars, however, have amoremoderate viewonHelmholtz’s
indebtedness toMill (e.g., Hatﬁeld 1990; Schiemann 2009). That said, however,
the secondary literature on the Helmholtz–Mill relation remains scarce.
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2. Diﬀerential Consciousness: A Centuries-Old
Debate
In his The Facts of Perception, Helmholtz deﬁned the problem of
diﬀerential consciousness as the question as to howweﬁrst come
to make a “distinction between thought and reality [Scheidung
von Gedachtem und Wirklichem]” (Helmholtz 1878, 242, 115–16).
In trying to tackle this problemHelmholtz engagedwith a long-
standing philosophical issue. In the nineteenth century espe-
cially, debates on this matter intensiﬁed and made apparent the
opposition between empiricism on the one hand, and nativism,
intuitionism and transcendentalism on the other.3 First and fore-
most, the problem at stake brought about ﬁerce discussions on
the systematic place of the subject and self-consciousness in
experience. While most approaches to the genesis of object con-
sciousness implicitly or explicitly presuppose a self-conscious,
unitary subject that founds the stability and identity of object-
experience over time, not all philosophical frameworks can ac-
commodate such a concept. Especially within strict association-
ist accounts of experience, the (lack of a) notion of the self has
caused considerable theoretical diﬃculties. Themajor challenge
for this particular tradition has been that of developing a work-
able notion of the subject, which does not in and by itself con-
demn any possible account of diﬀerentiation to circularity and
inﬁnite regress. The assimilation of self-consciousness to object-
consciousness (in so-called “objectal” accounts of the subject)
has proven to be particularly detrimental. Manfred Frank aptly
analyzes the theoretical deadlock as follows:
3To be sure, the problematization of subject-object diﬀerentiation is con-
tingent upon the denial that object-consciousness is directly given with mere
sensation. In Helmholtz’s case, this denial was based upon (the epistemo-
logical consequences of) Müller’s Law of Specific Nerve Energies (Gesetz der
Spezifischen Sinnesenergien), a physiological law that posits a fundamental in-
congruity between internal states of excitation and external objects and aﬀairs
(Müller 1833/40).
For naturalism, it is settled that if there is such a thing as subjec-
tivity at all, it is to be found among the natural entities. Natural
entities are however . . . objects; and discourse about anything ob-
jectal is a discourse de re. It thus seems self-evident that subjects
form a particular class of objects. (Frank 2007, 153)
Evidently, however, any account that (i) relies on a notion of
a unitary, self-conscious subject as the foundation of object-
consciousness, and at the same time (ii) reduces the former
to (a special kind of) the latter, presupposes what it aspires
to explain and thus leaves the very possibility of objectiﬁcation
unaccounted for.
From a historical point of view, David Hume’s Treatise of Hu-
man Nature oﬀers a most interesting case-study to illustrate the
problem at hand. A brief summary of Hume’s struggle with the
notion of the self and its relation to experience is therefore highly
instructive within the scope of this analysis, all the more so be-
cause Mill’s neo-Humean psychology would reproduce exactly
the same theoretical diﬃculties.
2.1. Hume’s Labyrinth
As is well-known, Hume liked to describe his philosophical
project in terms of an attempt to “anatomize” the mind, i.e., an
attempt to decompose mental phenomena into more primitive
elements (impressions and ideas), and reconstruct their forma-
tive history in themindbymeans of aminimal number ofmental
laws (see for example Hume 1740, 6; Hume 1739–40, 311). With
the latter, Hume had in mind the laws of association, which,
not unlike Newton’s laws of motion, would provide a suﬃcient
explanation for the way in which our most fundamental beliefs
about the world are generated from basic impressions (1739–
40, 58). In that sense, Humean philosophy oﬀers a prototypical
example of what Hatﬁeld callsmethodological naturalismwith re-
gard to the mind, i.e., “the attempt to discover ‘natural’ laws
of the mind, where ‘natural’ is cashed out through an analogy
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 6 no. 3 [44]
with the methods and modes of explanation in natural science,
instead of by an appeal to ontology” (Hatﬁeld 1990, 17). First
and foremost,methodological naturalism thus refers to a speciﬁc
mode of psychological explanation that envisions an a posteriori,
constructive account of mental phenomena, or, as Kant would
have it, a physiology of understanding (CPR4 AIX). Interestingly,
the stringent application of this methodology initially ledHume
to develop genetic accounts of the notions of thinghood and of
personal identity—or indeed, of object and self—that were fun-
damentally at odds with one another. As several authors have
noted, his later retraction of the theory of personal identity (see
below) might have indicated a certain awareness of this fun-
damental inconsistency, but it did not prevent the reception of
his associationism by many as fundamentally ﬂawed, not least
because it failed miserably at accounting for the genesis of dual
(diﬀerential) consciousness.
In the section “Of scepticismwith regard to the senses”, Hume
provided an outline of his answer to the question as to What
causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? (Hume 1739–40,
238–68). After denying that this belief could be given, either
directly through sensation or mediated by logical reasoning,
he proceeded to outline his take on the imaginative (i.e., as-
sociative) origin of the belief in thinghood. More particularly,
he argued that externally generated sensations, in contrast to
internally generated ones, succeed one another in a constant
and coherent manner and that by virtue of this qualitative dif-
ference, the former tend to be merged by imagination into the
associative construct that we call a thing (1739–40, 249). Sub-
sequently, Hume applied the same methodological strategy in
analyzing the genesis of the notion of the self in the section “Of
personal identity” (§I.4.iv). After having suspended the meta-
physical question concerning the self-in-itself, Hume set out
4Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is abbreviated as CPR here and in what
follows.
to pinpoint the psychological origin of the belief in a self as a
continued and distinct existence. In doing so, he resorted to a
quasi-observational, introspective strategy in search of the basic
sensible elements from which this belief might emerge. But in
entering “most intimately into what I call myself,” he famously
proclaimed, “I always stumble on some particular perception
or other . . . I never can catch myself at any time” (1739–40, 300).
From this, he ﬁnally concluded that the “mind is a kind of the-
atre, where several perceptions . . . make their appearance; pass,
re-pass, glide away, and mingle.” This is the broad outline of
Hume’s notorious ‘bundle theory’ of the self, i.e., his claim that
whatwe call personal identity is “nothing but a bundle or collec-
tion of diﬀerent perceptions” that refers to nothing but “a heap
or collection of diﬀerent perceptions . . . falsely . . . endow’d with
a perfect simplicity and identity” (1739–40, 257).
In itself, Hume’s bundle theorywas a systematic implementa-
tion of his methodological naturalism with regard to the prob-
lem of the origin of the notion of personal identity. Indeed,
as Singer notes, he “might . . . have stopped at that point, con-
gratulating himself on his explosion of a non-naturalistic notion
of the self” (Singer 2000, 232). This is, however, not what hap-
pened; Hume retracted his bundle theory a year after publishing
the Treatise, stating that he deemed his account to be “very de-
fective” as it cannot account for “the principle of connection”
that binds perceptions together (Hume 1739–40, 677). Further-
more, he desperately added that he found himself “involv’d in
such a labyrinth,” neither knowing “how to correct” his for-
mer opinions, “nor how to render them consistent” (1739–40,
675). Not only did Hume retract his former theory, however,
he simply threw in the proverbial towel and concluded: “For
my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess
that this diﬃculty is too hard for my understanding” (1739–
40, 678). A host of Hume scholars have pointed to the possible
detrimental eﬀects of Hume’s aporia with regard to the self on
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the soundness of his psychological project. Cassirer, for exam-
ple, claimed that Hume’s perplexity with regard to the subject
meant nothing less than “the collapse of the sensualistic scheme
of knowledge” as it left “the conceptual function by virtue of
which sensations are united in a lawful unity . . . without justi-
ﬁcation and ground” (Cassirer 1922, 387). More recently, Roth,
Stroud, Waxman, Singer, Strawson and Inukai, among others,
likewise argue in one way or another, that the idea of the self
as a bundle threatened the foundation of Hume’s associationist
psychology.5 Most generally, all of these criticisms unfold from
a central paradox in Hume’s system, namely that his associa-
tionism in general, and his account of thinghood in particular,
(a) presupposes a principle of subjectivity, i.e., an active, unitary
subject, that (b) cannot, however, be accounted for within the
naturalistic framework itself. As Strawson aptly describes it in
his excellent analysis of Hume’s struggle with the problem of
personal identity, Hume might have come to realize that “[h]is
theory works explicitly with something that it oﬃcially holds to
be unintelligible” (Strawson 2011, 134).
Within the scope of this paper, however, we are mainly in-
terested in the problems Hume’s bundle theory created with
regard to the philosophical problem of diﬀerential conscious-
ness. One of the peculiar implications of the bundle theory is
5While Waxman (1992, 235) argues that without a unifying princi-
ple Hume could not account for “the consciousness of perceptual succes-
sion . . . presupposed for the imagination to associate perceptions,” Roth (2000)
contends that Hume’s bundle theory was highly problematic with regard to
his theory of the object (see below). Stroud (2006, 344) in his turn argues that
the principles of imagination are simply too meagre to account for the genesis
of beliefs and thoughts, and that Hume, on account of his own methodology,
can simply not assume that “there are such things as active, thinking human
beings with experiences and thoughts”. As will be explained below, Inukai
(2007) takes issue with the “bundling problem”, i.e., the problem that the pos-
sibility of association depends somehow upon the ordered manner in which
impressions present themselves, prior to any associative activity.
that both the idea of personal identity and that of thinghood are
derived from exactly the same series of impressions:
Hume characterized psychological forces in terms of association
in the imagination which leads to running perceptions together
and treating them as if they had an identity over time. Given
such an understanding of the psychological forces at work, it is
hard to see how one might derive from the very same succession
of subjectively accessible perceptions on the one hand the idea
of personal identity—a single self uniﬁed over time—and on the
other hand a plurality of worldly objects. (Roth 2000, 113)
In other words, Hume’s bundle theory gravely aﬀected his psy-
chology of the object, and could even be said to make it unin-
telligible. If he retained his bundle view, object and self would
have to be constructed within the same series, without there be-
ing anymeans available to diﬀerentiate between the two. Hence,
there would be no self, no object, no experience; only a chaotic
universe of data with no subject to experience them. Hume’s
retraction, however, did not solve the problem, but rather con-
cealed it (Waxman 1992; Lloyd 1993). The question remains: how
can there be experience, without a subject that somehow relates
to itself as the one experiencing, and therefore, without a subject
in a position to diﬀerentiate between itself as experiencing and
the things experienced? Lloyd aptly summarizes the problem as
follows:
Even if Hume thought there were only one self in existence—
although of course as a good sceptic he could not claim to know
that—the problem which reduces him to dismay in the appendix
would remain. His real problem lies in getting a workable distinc-
tion between the intellectual world . . . and that other world, sup-
posedly there as independent object of knowledge. . . . In telling
Humean stories of the origin of beliefs, we must presuppose . . . a
unifying subject, aswemight now say. And this is whatHume can-
not presuppose. . . . [D]oes not the whole picture fall apart? (Lloyd
1993, 65–67)
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2.2. Diﬀerentiation after Hume: Intuitionism, Kant and
Fichte
The problems with Hume’s associationist account of experi-
ence initially led to a philosophical regression to what Hume
would have called the “vulgar standpoint”. In the wake of his
philosophical project, the common-sense movement arose in an
attempt to circumvent the apparent absurdities to which the
vigorous implementation of the naturalistic framework with re-
gard to the study of mind seemed to lead. Thinkers such as
Thomas Reid and SirWilliamHamilton dissolvedHume’s prob-
lems by founding diﬀerential consciousness in the “immediate
testimony of consciousness”. According to Reid, this is the only
sound alternative to Hume’s “metaphysically absurd” assump-
tion “that sensation and thought may be without a thinking
being” (Reid 1764, 108). “[C]onsciousness assures us that . . . we
are immediately cognizant of an external and extended non-
ego,” Reid maintained (1764, 745). In sharp contrast to Hume,
Reid considered the “belief in present existence” to be “the im-
mediate eﬀect of . . . constitution” (1764, 183). In the same vein,
he held that the concept of the self was “suggested by our consti-
tution”, and was therefore not in need of empirical explanation
(1764, 110). A similar approach was developed by Sir William
Hamilton, a disciple, commentator and critic of Thomas Reid,
who adopted the latter’s intuitionism and argued that “we are
immediately conscious in perception of an ego and a non-ego,
known together, and known in contrast to each other.” Although
Hamilton was one of the most eminent philosophers of his time,
one of the reasons he soon fell into historical oblivion was the
devastating attack on his philosophical system presented in J. S.
Mill’s 1865 An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,
which will be discussed in Section 3.6
6Hamilton’s prominent position in the philosophical landscape of his time
is attested, for example, in the works of J. S. Mill (1865/1878), Fraser (1865),
and Stirling (1865).
Amuchmore elegant position on thematterwasdevelopedby
Kant and his successors. Through a series of articles and books,
Patricia Kitcher presents a compelling body of evidence in favor
of the hypotheses that (i) Kant was well aware of Hume’s prob-
lems with personal identity when he wrote the CPR, and that
hence, (ii) some passages in the latter work—most importantly
the Deduction (A84–130/B116–69)—were written explicitly as
an attempt to overcome them.7 According to Kant, Hume’s bun-
dle theory was not so much wrong, as it was trivial. It is true, he
claimed, that what we ﬁnd through “inner sense” (or “empirical
apperception”) is “forever variable; it can provide no standing
or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances” (CPRA107).
But then again, he added:
That which should necessarily be represented as numerically iden-
tical cannot be thought of as such through empirical data. There
must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes the
latter itself possible. (CPR A107; see also Kitcher 1990, 102)
“[T]his original and transcendental condition,” according to
Kant, “is nothing other than the transcendental apperception”,
i.e., the I think, deﬁned as the necessary, a priori “unity of con-
sciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in re-
lation to which all representation of objects is alone possible”
(CPR A107). Only under this transcendental condition, Kant
argued, is the concept of an object intelligible, as “the original
and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the
same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the
synthesis of all appearances” (CPRA108).8 The shift from a nat-
7This hypothesis contradicts Kemp Smith’s (1923/1962), who maintained
that Kant had no knowledge of Hume’s problem. While there is no way of
determining whether Kant had actually read Hume on this topic, Kitcher
points to the mediating inﬂuence of for example Beattie and Tetens, two
ﬁgures whom Kant did read, and who addressed the problem extensively
in their works. For an overview of Kitcher’s arguments in this respect, see
Kitcher (1982, 43–44; 1990, 98–100; 2011, 31–32).
8The I think guarantees that a manifold “is united in one consciousness,”
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uralized (quid facti) to a normative (quid juris) investigation not
only allowedKant to diagnoseHume’s aporia, it likewise enabled
him to found experience and the possibility of diﬀerential con-
sciousness in the formal unity of the epistemic subject, thereby
sidestepping circularity issues.
To conclude this historical introduction, a consideration of
Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s further elaboration of the Kantian prin-
ciple of apperception is worthwhile, mainly because, as I have
argued elsewhere, the basic rationale of his approach to themat-
ter reappears in Helmholtz’s work.9 The most primitive fact to
be explained by transcendental philosophy, according to Fichte,
is that of how “I make a distinction within myself between a
knowing subject and a real force [reelle Kraft], which, as such,
does not know, but is” (Fichte 1798, 10–11). In addressing the
question as to “How do I come to make this distinction?” Fichte
ﬁrst and foremost attended to the grammatical subject of Kant’s
I think, wondering “Which ‘I’ is being spoken of here?” (Fichte
1794/1797–98, 48, 50–51; CPR B132).10 As such, Fichte’s philo-
sophical system was permeated by the conviction that the criti-
cal analysis of experience is not suﬃciently founded unless one
can account for the precise nature and structure of the tran-
and it is only by virtue of this self-referential structure that an object can
“become an object for me,” i.e., it is the “condition under which alone I can
ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp
them together.” Compare CPR (B132; boldface in original):
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for oth-
erwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought
at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be
impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. . . . Thus all manifold
of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in
which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act
of spontaneity, i.e., cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it
pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one.
9For a detailed discussion see De Kock (2014a, 2014b).
10For Fichte’s view on the fundamental incompleteness of Kant’s system,
also see Fichte (1796/99, 80).
scendental subject of knowledge, i.e., Kant’s so-called subject =
x.11 Hence, Fichte aimed to determine the conditions of possi-
bility for, and modalities of, the necessary self-reﬂexivity that
accompanies all acts of representation. In doing so, he famously
analyzed the ideal structure of the I in terms of self-positing
activity:
I ﬁndmyself to be acting eﬃcaciously in theworld of sense. All con-
sciousness arises from this discovery. Without this consciousness
of my own eﬃcacy [Wirksamkeit], there is no self-consciousness;
without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness of something
else that is not supposed to be I myself. (Fichte 1798, 5)
Fichte thus conceptualized the necessary self-reﬂexivity of the I
in terms of a primordial sense of agency, given through so-called
“intellectual intuition”, i.e., “the immediate consciousness that
I act . . . : it is that whereby I know something because I do it”
(Fichte 1794/1797–98, 38).12 In Fichte’s theorizing, the grammat-
ical subject of Kant’s I think is thus determined in terms of prac-
tical subjectivity, i.e., as a self-determining, volitional being. As
such, Fichte’s elaboration of Kant’s critical analysis amounted to
11See for example CPR (B404; emphasis added):
Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is
represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized
only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in
abstraction,we cannever have even the least concept; . . . we cannot separate
ourselves from this inconvenience, because the consciousness in itself is not
even a representation.
12It should be noted that Kant explicitly rejected the notion of intellectual
intuition as a mystic Unding, i.e., as nonsense. See for example Kant (1821,
425):
[I]ntellectual intuition . . . , i.e., the possibility that purely intellectual a priori
concepts . . . rest on immediate intuition of the understanding; This mysti-
cal hypothesis thus assumed that the understanding could operate like the
senses, having pure intuitions . . . ; however the faculty of intuition, which
rather applies to the senses alone, cannot be attributed to the understand-
ing . . .
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 6 no. 3 [48]
a system of knowledge in which “philosophy is pushed out of the
theoretical ﬁeld . . . over into the practical” (Fichte 1794/1797–98,
61).13 Through this shift from the I think to the I will in Fichte’s
system, the diﬀerential structure of consciousness is analyzed
in terms of a dynamical, reciprocal determination of the I and
the Not-I, related to one another as activity and resistance. The
object thus appears ﬁrst and foremost in its capacity of a Gegen-
stand, i.e., in its being-for-us as resistance and limit, that is to
be thought against the background of a knowingly agentive be-
ing.14 As a consequence, Fichte maintained that freedom is not
just a practical law (praktisches Gesetz), but moreover “a theoret-
ical principle [theoretisches Princip]” for the determination of our
world (Weltbestimmung) (Fichte 1798, 70).
3. Back into the Labyrinth: Mill’s Account
In his voluminous An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Phi-
losophy (1865/1878), Mill discussed what he considered one
of the most central questions of the philosophy of conscious-
ness, i.e., the “distinction between myself—the Ego—and a
13Or as Fichte captured it in his Vocation of Man (1800, 131):
[I]t is . . . our own real activity and . . . the deﬁnite laws of human action
which lies at the root of all our consciousness of a reality external to our-
selves . . . From this necessity of action proceeds the consciousness of the
actual world; and not the reverse way . . . We do not act because we know,
but we know because we are called upon to act: the practical reason is the
root of all reason.
14See for example Fichte (1794/1797–98, 228–29):
Insofar . . . as an object [Gegenstand] is to be posited, and as a condition of the
possibility for such positing, theremust be another activity [Tätigkeit] ( X)
occurring in the self, distinct from that positing. . . . The object is merely
posited, insofar as there is resistance [Widerstand] to an activity of the self;
no such activity, no object. It is related as determinant [Bestimmende] to
determinate [Bestimmten]. Only insofar as this activity is resisted, can an
object be posited; and so far as it is not resisted, there is no object.
world . . . external to me” (Mill 1865/1878, 6; 1843/1882, 579–
659). Through his analysis, Mill (i) aimed at demonstrating that
questions pertaining to the human mind can be dealt with con-
clusively by means of a strict empiricist methodology, thus (ii)
providing an argument in favor of the hegemony of empiricism
in the newly emerging ﬁeld of scientiﬁc psychology. As such,
Mill’s involvement with the problem of diﬀerential conscious-
ness can be considered as an implementation of his program
for a science of man, for which he laid the foundation in On the
Logic of Moral Sciences, the sixth book of his A System of Logic
(1843/1882). Similar to Hume’s analysis, Mill envisioned a ge-
netic study of mental phenomena, which takes as its point of
departure invariable laws that “have been ascertained by the
ordinary methods of experimental inquiry,” i.e., the laws of as-
sociation (Mill 1843/1882, 490; also see 1865/1878, 14). In the
Examination, Mill accordingly introduced his Psychological The-
ory of the Belief in an External World as an attempt to show that . . .
. . . there are associations naturally and even necessarily generated
by the order of our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensa-
tion, which, supposing no intuition of an external world to have
existed in consciousness, would inevitably generate the belief, and
would cause it to be regarded as an intuition. (Mill 1865/1878, 227)
According to Mill, only two general presuppositions are needed
for this associationist approach to the genesis of the notion of
thinghood, namely (1) the presumption that “the human mind
is capable of expectation,” i.e., that it can conceive of future pos-
sibilities, and (2) the laws of association (1865/1878, 225). Based
on these two postulates, Mill argued, it is theoretically possible
to account for the idea of the object in terms of a psycholog-
ical construct produced through the association of sensations
(Mill 1865/1878, 7). More speciﬁcally, he hypothesized that the
notion of the object as an independent existence derives from
the empirically formed notion of possible sensations: if we state
that consciousness contains a belief in the Not-I, this means that
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apart from the ﬂow of actual sensations, we acknowledge the
permanent possibility of sensation as a conditional certainty:
[T]he very idea of anything out of ourselves is derived solely from
the knowledge experience gives us of the Permanent Possibilities.
Our sensations we carry with us wherever we go, and they never
exist where we are not; but when we change our place we do not
carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: they
remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions with
which our presence in general has nothing to do. (Mill 1865/1878,
229, 238)
Once the idea of the object has been formed, experientially de-
rived knowledge about possible sensations guide future experi-
ence in a top-down manner, i.e., as inductive hypotheses about
the lawlike covariation between our movements and certain ag-
gregates of sensations. To illustrate his approach, Mill oﬀered
the following example:
I see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another
room. . . . [T]hough I have ceased to see it, I am persuaded that
the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations which it
gave me; but I believe that when I again place myself in the cir-
cumstances inwhich I had those sensations, that is, when I go again
into the room, I shall again have them; and further, that there has
been no intervening moment at which this would not have been
the case. . . . The conception I form of the world existing at any moment,
comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of
possibilities of sensation. (Mill 1865/1878, 228; emphasis added)
To account for the intuitive nature with which the belief in a
Not-I emerges in consciousness, Mill introduced the principle of
obliviscence that states that the associative chain from which the
idea of an object is generated, tends to “drop out of conscious-
ness.”15 As theprocess of associative construction is pushedback
15Mill (1865/1878, 323) explained the principle as follows: “[W]hen a num-
ber of ideas suggest one another by association with such certainty and ra-
pidity as to coalesce together in a group, those members of the group which
to the unconscious level, Mill proceeded, “we see, and cannot
help seeing, what we have learned to infer” (1865/1878, 227).
A striking feature of Mill’s psychological analysis, however,
is the way in which it reproduced the problems associated with
Hume’s Labyrinth (see Section 2.1). As Mill’s empiricist frame-
work allowed only for knowledge that is given by, or inferred
from sensible data, he was simply unable to account for the
subject presupposed by his theory. Indeed, as Alan Ryan notes,
“Mill’s philosophy required an active mind which would con-
struct an external world out of sensations . . . and yet he had
no way of accounting for the existence of such an active intelli-
gence” (Ryan 1974, 226). To be sure,Mill attended to the problem
of the self in a surprisingly short and quite puzzling chapter of
his Investigation entitled “The psychological Theory of the be-
lief in matter, how far applicable to mind.” In this chapter, Mill
pondered the question of “whether, at the ﬁrst moment of our
experience, we already have in our consciousness the concep-
tion of Self as a permanent existence; or whether it is formed
subsequently, and admits of a similar analysis” (Mill 1865/1878,
240). In addressing the issue, Mill’s reasoningwent as follows. If
the belief in external existence allows for an analysis in terms of
the permanent possibility of sensation, then the mind (or inter-
nal existence) can be equated with something like a permanent
possibility of feeling, i.e., an imaginative compound of the ﬂux
of feelings presently experienced, and those to be experienced
in the future. However, as Mill correctly observed, this account
would be entirely circular, as the very idea of permanent possi-
bilities is founded in the hypothesized capability of expectation,
and as such, the theorywould presuppose the very thing it aims
to demonstrate. Mill acknowledged that the self, according to
this rationale,would thushave to be “a series of feeling, . . . aware
of itself as a series” (1865/1878, 248). After dwelling a bit more
remain long without being specially attended to, have a tendency to drop out
of consciousness.”
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 6 no. 3 [50]
on the topic, he concluded that the self simply does not allow
for psychological analysis:
The truth is, that we are here face to face with that ﬁnal inexplica-
bility . . . [O]ne mode of stating it only appears more incomprehen-
sible than another . . . I think, by far the wisest thing we can do, is
to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes
place. (Mill 1865/1878, 262)
The feeling of déjà vu grows when we consider the appendix
added in the 1878 version of the Examination, in which Mill ac-
knowledged that “in so far as reference to an Ego is implied in
Expectation, I do postulate an Ego” (1865/1878, 258). At this
point in time, Mill granted that the ability to anticipate (as is
implied by the concept of expectation) presupposes a subject
that is somehow aware of itself as a unity in time, referring past
and future experiences to itself, while maintaining its numerical
identity. The Ego, he therefore stated in the appendix, is “the
inexplicable tie, or law . . . which connects the present conscious-
ness with the past one . . . ,” which “is as real as the sensations
themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of thought”
(1865/1878, 262).
Not surprisingly, it did not take long for Mill’s failure to ac-
count adequately for the subject presupposed in his association-
ism to be criticized. William James noted that Mill “makes the
same blunder as Hume” and considered it to be symptomatic
for “the deﬁnitive bankruptcy of the associationist description
of the consciousness of self” (James 1890, 358–59). Alan Ryan,
in his turn, claims that Mill’s failure to account for the foun-
dation of his associationist psychology meant nothing less than
a “disaster for his whole philosophical system,” as “the meta-
physics to which Mill was committed had a contradiction at its
heart” (Ryan 1974, 226). AndyHamilton contends thatMill’s “ﬁ-
nal inexplicability” “echoes Hume’s confession of failure in his
own Appendix to the Treatise, even if the tone appears unduly
complacent rather than troubled,” adding that “both writers,
perhaps, suspect that a yawning chasm is opening up around
their philosophical viewpoint, andwould prefer not to peer into
it” (Hamilton 1998, 165). To summarize, the “yawning chasm”
in question pertains to the way in which both Hume’s andMill’s
perplexity with regard to the question of the subject threat-
ened the intelligibility of associationism in general, and that of
diﬀerential consciousness in particular. As will be explored in
what follows, this historical empiricist deadlock may well be
considered a systematic motive for Helmholtz’s shift towards
a transcendentally inspired approach in his treatment of diﬀer-
ential consciousness. In contrast to existing analyses, however,
the emphasis in this respect will not be so much on Helmholtz’s
peculiar appropriation of Kant’s a priori view of causality, but
rather on the way in which he determined the principle of free
will and the possibility of autonomous action as a precondi-
tion of the possibility for experience. Doing so will not only
present an excellent occasion to further ﬂesh out the details of
Helmholtz’s intellectual relation to Mill, it inevitably leads us
to brieﬂy consider Helmholtz’s way of appropriating Fichtean
insights in his theory of perception.
4. Hermann von Helmholtz’s Hovering Between
Empiricism and Transcendentalism
Although the vast amount of literature on Helmholtz’s complex
epistemological position prevents any one-sided interpretation,
there is indeed suﬃcient textual evidence to support the hypoth-
esis of a direct inﬂuence of J. S. Mill on Helmholtz’s theory of
perception as unconscious inference, as several authors noted
(see note 2). Furthermore, there are somemore general parallels
between both authors in their general conception of a program
of a science of man. Both ﬁercely advocated methodological
naturalism with regard to the mind and rejected physicalism
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or what Mill called “biologized psychology” (1843/1882, 592).16
While Helmholtz famously deﬁned his empiricism in opposi-
tion to nativism, Mill put forward his philosophical project as
an alternative to what he called the a priori school of philos-
ophy, a term that covered both (common-sense) intuitionism
and (post-Kantian) idealism in his thought.17 Interestingly, the
16Mill’s science of man was once credited by F. Albert Lange as an attempt
to “assert the rights of psychology,” “against the strictly materialistic view”
(Lange 1881, 189). Mill’s non-reductionist stance is illustrated for example by
the following passage taken from his A System of Logic (1843/1882, 590–91):
Whether . . . mental states are . . . dependent on physical conditions, is one
of the vexatae questiones in the science of human nature. . . . Many eminent
physiologists hold the aﬃrmative. These contend . . . that some particular
state of our nervous system, . . . in particular . . . the brain, invariably pre-
cedes, and is presupposed by, every state of our consciousness. According
to this theory, one state of mind is never really produced by another: all
are produced by states of the body. . . . [T]hat every mental state has a
nervous state for its immediate antecedent and proximate cause, . . . can
not . . . be said to be proved, . . . and even were it certain, yet everyone must
admit that we are wholly ignorant of the characteristics of these nervous
states . . . [T]he successions therefore, which obtain among mental phe-
nomena, do not admit of being deduced from the physiological laws of
our nervous organization. . . . [T]herefore . . . there is a distinct and separate
Science of Mind.
17It is important to note that Mill’s conception of “the a priori school” was
very (even excessively) broad, and targeted not only German Idealism, but
likewise all forms of nativism and intuitionism with regard to mental con-
tents. From this perspective, Mill put Hamilton’s intuitionism on a par not
only with Reid, but also with Kant, stating that “the test by which they all de-
cide a belief to be a part of our primitive consciousness—an original intuition
of the mind—is the necessity of thinking it” (Mill 1865/1878, 142). One could
obviously contend that this allegation implies an unwarranted identiﬁcation
of (radically diﬀerent) schools of thought. While this criticism would be com-
pletely justiﬁed—it suﬃces to point out the immense diﬀerence between (i)
common sense’s introspective method and Kant’s transcendental regression,
and (ii) genetic versus transcendental apriorism, for example—andwhile Mill
could indeed have been somewhat more reﬁned in the identiﬁcation of his
enemy, it is unlikely that this would have had any eﬀect on his disapproval
of both. The “conﬂation” at work here seems to be no more than a part of
details of Mill’s and Helmholtz’s psychological accounts of the
genesis of external experience also resonate in important ways.
It is therefore no wonder that authors such as Boring (1950, 304)
have argued that Helmholtz “belongs . . . systematically more
with British thought than with German, in the tradition of John
Locke down to the Mills” and that Hochberg (2007, 331) even
went as far as completely assimilating Helmholtz’s psychologi-
cal analysis to Mill’s in talking of “Helmholtz-Mill” theories of
perception.
To a certain extent Helmholtz’s psychology of the object can
indeed be interpreted as a continuation of the empiricist tra-
dition, insofar as he (i) conceives of the perceptual object as
a complex—as opposed to a simple, intuitive, unanalyzable—
mental phenomenon, which can hence be (ii) decomposed into
more basic elements (sign-sensations) and (iii) reconstructed ac-
cording to general mental laws. Similar to the process of lan-
guage acquisition and comprehension, Helmholtz famously ar-
gued, sensations are ﬁrst and foremost “signs [Zeichen] which
we have learned to decipher” through the repeated experience
of a lawlike covariation between voluntary movement and the
coming into being of certain sensations (Helmholtz 1869, 222).18
a rhetorical strategy to put forward his own empiricist philosophy, which is
intended to challenge common sense as well as Kantianism, although it can be
argued that the challenge faced is not the same with respect to both schools.
18Also see Helmholtz (1894, 250):
An instructive example is the comprehension of our native language. This
knowledge is not inborn; . . . we have acquired our mother tongue by learn-
ing, that is, by usage through frequently repeated experience. . . . The child
hears the usual name of an object pronounced again and again when it is
shown or given to him, and constantly hears the same change in the vis-
ible environment described with the same word. Thus the word becomes
attached to the thing in his memory . . . [A]t the beginning we still remem-
ber the individual cases where we have heard it used. Later . . . we are no
longer able to recount under what particular circumstances we came to
this knowledge . . .
For Helmholtz’s sign-theory of perception, also see Helmholtz (1868, 1869,
1878).
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The way in which this general approach resonates with Mill’s
becomes very tangible in the following quotation:
Let us call the entire group of aggregate sensations induced . . . by
a certain deﬁnite and ﬁnite group of the will’s impulses the ‘cur-
rent presentables’ [Präsentabilien]; by contrast, let us call ‘present’
[präsent] the aggregate of sensations from this group which is just
coming to perception. Our observer . . . can make each individual
presentable present to himself at any moment through execution
of the relevant movement. In this way it seems to him that each
individual from this group of presentables exists at each moment
during this period of time. . . . Thus the idea of a simultaneous and
continuous existence of diﬀerent things alongside one another will
be achieved. (Helmholtz 1878, 350)
At ﬁrst sight at least, this approach is strikingly similar to Mill’s,
as it puts forward a genetic account of the notion of thing-
hood in terms of an associative compound of expected sen-
sory changes (“presentables”). Once learned, these experien-
tially constructed laws or conditional certainties come to func-
tion as major premises in the inductive process that Helmholtz
hypothesized to be at the basis of perception. The most gen-
eral rule underlying the perceptual process, Helmholtz there-
fore claimed, is that “such objects are always imagined as being
present . . . as would have to be there in order to produce the same
impression on the nervousmechanism” (Helmholtz 1856–66, III,
2, emphasis added). Not unlike Mill, Helmholtz thus claimed
that the notion of the object is a generative hypothesis pertaining
to expected contingencies that is projected onto the visual ﬁeld
and as such, gives rise to the experience of a world out there.
This, in short, is the basis of Helmholtz’s theory of perception as
unconscious inference, or his “projection theory” of perception:
it is the unconscious application of a general law (the major
premise) to a particular sensible event.19 In both the ﬁrst and
19This speciﬁcally projectivist understanding of objectiﬁcation in perception
was anticipated inHume’s account of ideas (like that of causality, or the notion
the second, revised, version of his Treatise on Physiological Op-
tics (Handbuch der physiologischenOptik), Helmholtz creditedMill
with giving the best explanation of the nature of inductive con-
clusions (Inductiven Schlüsse), especially regarding the empirical
and hence provisional nature of the major premise (1856–66, III,
447, 1896, III, 581). In the same vein as Mill had argued in the
section Of Analogy of his A System of Logic, Helmholtz claimed
that the particular inductions at work in the perceptual process
are based upon the analogy of the present case (or current sen-
sations) with previously constructed inductive generalizations
(1856–66, III, 447).20 In contrast to perfect or complete induction,
this analogical form of reasoning is fallible in nature, and while
varying degrees of probability are possible, the correctness of
these inductive hypotheses has to be tested in every particular
case at hand.21 Finally, it is worth noting that both Helmholtz
and Mill used the same strategy in accounting for the apparent
immediacy of object-consciousness, namely by appealing to a
process of unconscious learning (1856–66, III, 32).
Despite the similarities between Helmholtz and Mill with re-
spect to their conception of a science of man in general and their
account of object-consciousness in particular, they disagreed on
some central issues. In addition to the well-known diﬀerences
of existence) as products of the mind’s “propensity to spread itself on external
objects”. See Hume (1739–40, 217).
20Helmholtz (1856–66, III, 26) gives the following example:
When those nervous mechanisms whose terminals lie on the right-hand
portions of the retinas of the two eyes have been stimulated, our usual
experience, repeated a million times all through life, has been that a lu-
minous object was over there in front of us on our left. We had to lift the
hand toward the left to hide the light or to grasp the luminous object; or
we had to move toward the left to get closer to it. Thus while in these cases
no particular conscious conclusion may be present, yet the essential and
original oﬃce of such a conclusion has been performed . . . simply, . . . by
the unconscious processes of association of ideas . . .
21See Mill (1843/1882, 394). For Helmholtz’s appropriation of Mill’s views
on induction, also see Hatﬁeld (1990, 200).
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between both in their appreciation of (post-)Kantian idealism—
Mill’s anti-idealism contrasted sharply with Helmholtz’s self-
professed indebtedness to transcendental philosophy—their
views diverged with respect to the question of whether the sci-
entiﬁc character of psychology is determined by a commitment
to causal determinism.22 Mill left no doubt that he indeed con-
sidered the latter to be a conditio sine qua non for a science of
man, and therefore assumed that “the law of causality applies
in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenom-
ena”. ”To assume the contrary—i.e., to assume that the will
is not determined, like other phenomena, by antecedents, but
determines itself” he added, would be “fatal to the attempt to
treat human conduct as a subject of science” (Mill 1843/1882,
581).23 Helmholtz’s psychological analysis, on the other hand,
proceeded from the assumption that “agents act out of free will
and are furthermore conscious of this freedom” (Heidelberger
1994, 171). In sharp contrast to Mill, Helmholtz thus denied
that the perceptual process can be fully accounted for in terms
of the “mechanically acquired association of ideas” (Helmholtz
22See for exampleMill (1843/1882, 579): “Principles of evidence and theories
of method are not be constructed a priori. The laws of our rational faculty, like
those of every other natural agency, are only learned by seeing the agent at
work.” Mill’s criticism against a priori psychology can also be found in Mill
(1859, 97–152).
23We should add that this application of the law of causality to human vo-
lition, in Mill’s work, does not eliminate the feeling of moral freedom itself.
Rather than defending determinism, Mill argues for compatibilism in the in-
troduction to the sixth volume of his A System of Logic. A complete discussion
of Mill’s theory of free will falls, however, outside of the scope of this dis-
cussion. What is relevant to us here, is that Mill’s argument for the universal
applicability of the law of causality to human action contradicts Helmholtz’s
insistence on the autonomous and unconditioned nature of the will’s impulse.
This interpretation contradicts Steege (2012, 167–70), who putsHelmholtz and
Mill on a par with regard to the question of free will. However, I believe this
interpretation is based on an insuﬃcient appreciation of the constitutive role
of the will’s impulse in Helmholtz’s thought, as laid down particularly in
Helmholtz (1878, 1892).
1855, 114–15, my translation). It is true, he argued, that “we have
learned to link certain representations to certain sensations,” but
this does not explainhowweﬁrst arrive at a “distinctionbetween
thought and reality [Scheidung von Gedachtem und Wirklichem]”
(1878, 242). To account for the latter, Helmholtz introduced the
principle of free will and the derivative idea of autonomous
action determination as foundational explanatory principles in
his psychology. In what follows, Mill’s and Helmholtz’s respec-
tive positions on freedom and self-determination as explanatory
principles in psychological sciencewill therefore be explored. In
doing so,we are exclusively interested in thediﬀerences between
both authors regarding the explanatory role of autonomous ac-
tion determination in analyzing mental phenomena. As such,
questions regarding the relation of both authors’ epistemology
to their ethical views, the relation of the concepts of freedomand
liberty, the problem of compatibilism, and so on, are suspended.
Rather, we are interested exclusively in the possible epistemic
role of freedom within Mill’s and Helmholtz’s psychology, and
more particularly, in the way in which Helmholtz’s qualiﬁcation
of the epistemic subject as a knowingly free agent can be read as
an attempt to circumvent the problems encountered by Hume
and Mill as sketched above.
4.1. Founding the Self: Freedom and Self-Determination
The diﬀerence between Helmholtz and Mill in their reception
of German Idealism was maybe most salient in their interpre-
tation of the causal law. While Mill was committed to the clas-
sical empiricist regularity view of causality (Mill 1843/1882),
Helmholtz maintained that the “causal law is really an a priori
given, transcendental law” and professed his indebtedness to
Kant in this respect on several occasions (e.g., Helmholtz 1878,
363).24 Helmholtz’s peculiar appropriation of Kant’s apriorism
24In determining the causal law as an a priori, regulative law of thought,
Helmholtz (1856–66, III, 453) furthermore explicitly juxtaposed his view to
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is a much-debated topic in the secondary literature, as is its
systematic place in Helmholtz’s epistemology.25 However, the
causal law also had a pivotal role in Helmholtz’s psychology
of perception. Helmholtz established the law as a precondition
for perceptual objectiﬁcation, since unless one presupposes “the
presence of external objects as the cause of nervous excitation,
because there can be no eﬀect without a cause”, a subject would
never escape the state of mere nervous excitation (Helmholtz
1855, 116, my translation).26 Although the causal law could thus
be said to provide a transcendental motive, so to speak, for the
externalization of subjective sensations, it does not, however, ac-
count for the genesis of the idea of an external object as such. In
Helmholtz’s psychological analysis, the latter originates through
a negative operation, i.e., through the negation of the will’s im-
pulse (Willensimpuls). In this respect, it is helpful to take another
that of J. S. Mill:
The lawof causation, . . . has to be considered . . . as being a lawof our think-
ing which is prior to all experience. . . . The law of causation was supposed
to be a law of nature arrived at by induction. Recently it has been again
interpreted in that way by J. S. Mill. . . . As opposed to that view, I shall
merely say, . . . that there is a good reason to think that the empirical proof
of the law is extremely doubtful.
25Riehl (1904) and Schiemann (2009), for example, argue that Helmholtz’s
mature view of causality is on a par with empiricists such as Mill and/or
Hume. Alternatively, Heimann (1974), Fullinwider (1990) and Hatﬁeld (1990)
maintain that Helmholtz’s view of causality remained Kantian in spirit, while
Turner (1977) suggests that Helmholtz alignedmore with Fichte on this point.
26It is interesting to note that in 1869 (115) the neo-Kantian Otto Liebmann
put forward a similar account of the theoretical relation between perceptual
objectiﬁcation and causal understanding. In order to explain the capacity for
objectiﬁcation, the latter stated, we should presume that . . .
Human understanding is always, independently of the empirical circum-
stances, convinced, that it is possible to formulate a satisfying answer to
the question ‘Where is this coming from?’ . . . Therefore, the category of
causality is the a priori form of understanding. And it is . . . the condition
of possibility of every possible perception, and therefore, of experience.
look at Helmholtz’s argumentation in favor of his a priori view of
causality. In pondering the source of this law, Helmholtz denied
that it is derived from experience, as it is the very condition of
externalization. And he goes on:
Can we get it from the internal experience of our self-conscious-
ness? No; since we conceive of self-conscious acts of volition and
thought as free; i.e., we deny that they are the necessary eﬀects of
suﬃcient causes. As such, the investigation into sense perception
amounts to the insight already delivered by Kant: that the propo-
sition “no eﬀect without a cause” is a law of thought, given before
every experience. (Helmholtz 1855, 116, my translation)
In this passage, Helmholtz thus argues for the aprioricity of the
causal law, based on (a) its status as a condition, not an ef-
fect, of outer experience, and (b) a seemingly self-evident af-
ﬁrmation of the spontaneous, self-determined nature of inner
experience. Note how these presuppositions install a radical
discontinuity between internal and external experience, that is
furthermore said to supervene upon the juxtaposition of their
hypothesized respective regulative principles, namely volition or
self-determination versus causal determination. Indeed, Helmholtz
claimed, “[w]e assume . . . a principle of free will, for which we
claim . . . a complete independence from the stern law of causal-
ity. . . . The case of conduct [handeln], that is best . . . known to
us, we consider as an exception to the law” (Helmholtz 1856–
66, III, 454; my translation). Accordingly, Helmholtz maintained
that the will’s impulse “has neither already been inﬂuenced by
physical causes, which simultaneously determine the physical
process, nor itself psychically inﬂuenced the succeeding per-
ceptions” (1878, 358–59). Hence, the processes assumed to regu-
late human behavior in Helmholtz’s psychology are dissociated
from those that govern the physical and physiological realm,
and considered instead as emerging from an act of will (Willens-
act), conceived of as a spontaneous “mental act [psychischer Act]”
(1878, 359; 1896, 594). Helmholtz’s emphasis on the autonomy
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of the will’s impulse thus correlated with a non-reductionism of
the kind also put forward inMill’s plea against “biologized psy-
chology”. However, whereas Mill’s non-reductionism derived
from a negative argument—i.e., the lack of evidence that would
support a suﬃciently warranted derivation of mental laws from
physical/physiological ones—Helmholtz’s was at least in part
based upon the assumption of a generic diﬀerence between the
central explanatory principles of human behavior and natural
phenomena, i.e., freedom versus causal determinism. Contrary
to Mill, he therefore concluded that “in ascribing to ourselves
free-will, we deny in toto the possibility of referring at least one
of the ways in which our mental activity expresses itself to a rig-
orous law” (1862, 85). More importantly, however, Helmholtz
assigned a pivotal role to autonomous action determination in
his account of the problem we have centralized in this analysis,
namely the problem of diﬀerential consciousness. That is, he
accounted for the genesis of the object as a negation of the will’s
impulse, i.e., as the experience of a “power equivalent to our
will, . . . a power opposing us [uns entgegentretendeMacht]” (1878,
361). This is where Helmholtz’s theorizing started to resonate
with Fichte, whohadonce characterized theNot-I as a “the nega-
tion of activity; that is, . . . as ‘being’ [Sein], which is the concept of
cancelled activity” (Fichte 1796/99, 67; emphasis added), thereby
redeﬁning perceptual experience as an encounter as Hyppolite
(1959) noted, i.e., as a reciprocal determination [Wechselbestim-
mung] of activity and resistance. Indeed, asWestheimer (2008, 7)
put it, in Helmholtz’s theorizing “reality is what remains invari-
ant when the expected changes due to willed movements are
factored out from the sensory impressions.” However, as was
the case in Fichte’s philosophy, this kind of dynamics would
require a direct awareness of self-determined action on the part
of the subject.
4.2. Agency and Inner Intuition
“Eﬀorts . . . to establish belief in external reality,” Helmholtz in-
deed maintained “must remain unsuccessful so long as they
proceed only from passive observation” (Helmholtz 1892, 359).
Given the crucial role of the experiment in the constitution of ex-
perience in Helmholtz’s thought, Heidelberger (1993) was right
in stating it seemed to fulﬁll the role of an ars inveniendi, rather
than an ars demonstrandi. From what has been said thus far, it
should be clear that the crucial operative principle in the ex-
periment, according to Helmholtz, is not so much the physical
movement itself but rather the experience of the contrast be-
tween self-determined alterations within the visual ﬁeld and
the negation thereof, or as one might say, between will and re-
sistance. Accordingly, Helmholtz explained:
[H]uman actions, . . . posited by the will, form an indispensable
part of our sources of knowledge. We have seen that our sense im-
pressions are only a sign language . . . We humans must ﬁrst learn
tounderstand this sign system, and that happenswhenwe . . . learn
to distinguishwhich changes in our sense impressions follow from
our acts of will, and which others enter independently of will.
(Helmholtz 1892, 410)
Or as Helmholtz put it elsewhere: it is only through experimen-
tation that we come to discover a world “independent of our
will and imagination, that is, an external cause of our sensa-
tions” (1856–66, 31–32).
As already mentioned, this dynamic presupposes a direct
awareness of self-determined action, that Helmholtz ascribed
to inner intuition [innere Anschauung]. “In the experiment,”
Helmholtz speciﬁed, “the causal chain runs throughout our
self-consciousness.” The possibility of making sense of this
“chain” in terms of external events depends on the fact that
“we know one member of these causes—our will’s impulse—
from inner intuition, and know the motive by which it has oc-
curred” (Helmholtz 1878, 358). To this he added that “[t]he
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impulse to movement, is something directly perceivable. We
feel that we do something . . . we do not know directly what we
do”, i.e., the internal act of will is felt before its physical con-
sequences (1878, 348, emphasis added). In the second, revised
edition of his Handbuch, Helmholtz deﬁned inner intuition as
that by means of which “we observe [Wahrnehmen] processes in
ourmental life [Seelenleben]”, and points to the radical diﬀerence
with outer intuition, i.e., “perceptions of external objects” (1896,
577).
While Helmholtz’s distinction between inner and outer intu-
ition contains a superﬁcial gesture towards Kant’s critical sys-
tem, his theorizing by far exceeds the Kantian framework. Most
notably, Helmholtz uses an immediacy criterion to distinguish
between both. While “inner intuition” guarantees that the will’s
impulse is “directly perceivable”, the possibility of outer intu-
ition is said to be contingent upon the self-reﬂexivity of volun-
tary action. In this context, it is interesting tonote thatHelmholtz
came quite close to rearticulating Kant’s apriorism with regard
to space in terms of the will’s impulse. To the extent that the
problem of diﬀerential consciousness can be reformulated in
terms of a geometrical opposition between the spatial, and the
non-spatial world, Helmholtz aﬃrmed . . .
. . . space would be a . . . form of intuition prior to all experience
insofar as its perception would be tied to the possibility of the
will’s motoric impulses, and for which the mental and corporeal
ability must be given us through our organization before we can
have spatial intuition. (Helmholtz 1878, 349)
At ﬁrst sight at least, Helmholtz’s strong emphasis on the logical
and psychological primacy of the will’s impulse allowed him to
sidestep some of the main problems faced by the empiricists
discussed in the previous sections. For one thing, by presuppos-
ing a generic diﬀerence between (agentive) self-consciousness
and object-consciousness, and by turning the former into a
(psycho-)logical condition of the latter, Helmholtz avoided the
problem of inﬁnite regress in accounting for the genesis of self-
world diﬀerentiation. In the same vein, Helmholtz’s account did
not face the diﬃculty of having to derive both the I and theNot-I
from a homogeneous series of sensations. By positing a direct,
“intuitive”, awareness of the will’s impulse a heterogeneity is
introduced in the ﬂux of sensations:
Those changes which [we] can bring forth and annul by conscious
impulses of the will are to be distinguished from those which are
not consequences of thewill’s impulses and cannot be overcome by
such. The latter ﬁnding is negative. Fichte’s appropriate expression
for it is that a Non-Ego forces recognition of itself vis-à-vis the Ego.
(Helmholtz 1878, 351)
Helmholtz’s reference to Fichte in this context is quite telling. In
the end, the possibility of perceptual consciousness in his theory
is fundamentally dependent on the Fichtean idea of “the acting
I’s ability to experience itself immediately in its productivity
[sich in seiner Produktivität erfahrenkönnende handelnden Ich],” as
Schulz (2004, 49) expresses it. The analysis presented in this
paper aligns with Heidelberger’s take on the matter:
Helmholtz appropriated the view that our consciousness comes
to shape its conception of the outer world through the limitations
we experience in our practical actions. Only by actively interfering
with the world of external objects can we interpret our sensations
as due to external causes and thereby distinguish them from the
free acts of thinking inside our consciousness. (Heidelberger 1993,
463)
Although the very idea of a Fichtean inﬂuence in Helmholtz’s
work may seem to be at odds with Helmholtz’s strong anti-
metaphysical stance, textual evidence suggests a restricted, but
nevertheless important intellectual indebtedness.27 As Turner
27Evidence for this intellectual relation can be drawn mainly from
Helmholtz’s letters to his father, as quoted in Koenigsberger (1902–03). For
a full analysis, see De Kock (2014a, 2014b).
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notes, Helmholtz apparently distinguished between “two as-
pects of Fichte’s thought,” and accepted Fichte’s philosophy to
the extent that it “represented a phenomenology of conscious-
ness,” while he “resolutely rejected Fichte’s . . . attempts to build
an idealist metaphysics on that basis” (Turner 1977, 57). Unfor-
tunately, it remains unclear what exactly Helmholtz had read of
Fichte. In a 1841 letter to his godfather Immanuel Hermann
Fichte, the young Helmholtz—a student in medicine at that
time—stated that he has “recently studied some works of your
great father [ihres Grossen Vaters],” but unfortunately, he did
not specify which works exactly he had studied. From a foot-
note in the second, revised version of his Treatise, it is clear that
Helmholtz had been impressed by Fichte’s 1817 Facts of Con-
sciousness, about which he writes that it contains “correct and
precisely articulated [Richtige, scharf ausgesprochen] insights” on
the nature of sense perception. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to assume, as Turner does for example, that Helmholtz must
have had some degree of familiarity with the Science of Knowl-
edge. Helmholtz’s availablewritings and correspondence do not,
however, providedecisive evidence on thatmatter (Turner 1977).
Without downplaying the importance of getting a ﬁrmer
grasp of the factual historical relation between the two authors,
however, this paper has presented an alternative angle from
which to study the Fichtean elements in Helmholtz’s thought,
and his wavering between empiricism and transcendentalism.
That is to say, the historical narrative constructed in the previous
pages allows a better grasp of the philosophical stakes of the in-
tertwinement of philosophical perspectives in Helmholtz’s the-
ory of perception. To be sure, although this exposition couldwell
provide a diﬀerent angle from which to approach Helmholtz’s
theorizing, it does not assume that the latter arose from a self-
conscious attempt to overcome theproblemsof empiricism. How-
ever, Helmholtz’s normative qualiﬁcation of the subject as au-
tonomous and self-determining seems to circumvent the clas-
sical problems of circularity and inﬁnite regress. Nevertheless,
the position Helmholtz developed on this topic is as ingenious
as it is fragile, as will be clear from the concluding remarks.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this contribution, a historical framework was introduced that
served as an interpretive tool in trying to get a ﬁrmer grasp
of Helmholtz’s wavering between empiricism and transcenden-
talism, speciﬁcally with regard to the problem of diﬀerential
consciousness. After placing Helmholtz within a historical nar-
rative stretching from Hume to Mill, it was argued that he over-
stepped the boundaries of the strict naturalist framework when
he founded the possibility of association in the unconditioned
will’s impulse, or more generally, in his normative qualiﬁca-
tion of the epistemic subject as free and autonomous. In do-
ing so, it seems Helmholtz was in a better position to avoid the
problems of empiricism in accounting for diﬀerential conscious-
ness, most notably circularity and inﬁnite regress. However,
Helmholtz’s peculiar appropriation of insights from the tran-
scendental tradition within his psychophysiology raises com-
plex questions of its own. For instance, there is Helmholtz’s
peculiar appeal to “inner intuition” as the basis of the sense of
agency, and more particularly, to his rather vague and dubious
use of the term. In 1896, Helmholtz used it interchangeably
with the notion of self-consciousness, which he in turn deﬁned
in terms of self-observation (Helmholtz 1896, 577). Given that
self-consciousness would therefore be equated with a form of
observational knowledge, one could obviously object that it can
no longer fulﬁl its foundational role with regard to the problem
of diﬀerential consciousness and invites problems of circular-
ity. But even if one would stick to Helmholtz’s 1878 deﬁni-
tion of inner intuition in terms of an immediate feeling of self-
determination, some important issues remain. For one thing,
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it raises questions with regard to Helmholtz’s well-known criti-
cismof “the older concept of intuition”, and sets limits to his self-
professed ambition to resolve at least part of that older concept
into the concept of thought. Indeed, the deﬁnition of the “older
concept of intuition” as something that “comes to consciousness
immediatelywith the sense impression andwithout recollection
and eﬀort” could well apply to his own concept of inner intu-
ition, that refers exactly to this kind of eﬀortless, unmediated
(self-)consciousness (1878, 355). So while Helmholtz’s emphasis
on the inferential nature of object perception derived at least in
part from an attempt to rethink the old concept of intuition—
especially its alleged immediacy—by introducing the hypothe-
sis of unconscious inference, this criticism seemed to be entirely
absent in his use of the notion of inner intuition. Furthermore,
it is not very clear how one should interpret this immediacy
criterion, as it seems to hover somewhere in between the status
of a normative principle and a sensible given, or more generally,
between logical aprioricity and psychological givenness. That is
to say, while Helmholtz established the principle of free will as
a regulative principle for psychology, he went on to inscribe this
normative view regarding the possibility of self-determined ac-
tion onto our inborn psychophysiological organization, atwhich
level it functions as a sort of naturalized a priori. As such, we
are once again faced with the much-debated issues surround-
ing Helmholtz’s peculiar appropriation of transcendentalism in
general, and of the a priori in particular.28
Additional interpretive diﬃculties arise, for example, from
Helmholtz’s attempt to incorporate the intuitive awareness of
the will’s impulse into his physiological analysis, where it resur-
faces in the concept of the sensation (Empfindung) of the inten-
sity of the eﬀort of will (Intensität unserer Willensanstrengung),
28For some interesting discussions on this topic, see for example Na-
torp (1888), DiSalle (1993), and Patton (2009). For a detailed discussion of
Helmholtz’s struggle with Kant’s concept of Anschauung, see De Kock (2016).
and basically denotes the sensible correlate of self-generated
action (Helmholtz 1856–66, 599). The latter is, however, spec-
iﬁed as a purely mental event, and as such, distinguished from
the physical manifestations of voluntary action, i.e., the “ten-
sion of the muscles [Spannung der Muskeln]” and the (visible)
“results of the eﬀort [Erfolg der Anstrengung]” (1856–66, 599). Al-
though physiologists after Helmholtz—most notably Wilhelm
Wundt—would later adopt and further elaborate on this pecu-
liar concept, it soon came under attack as a redundant hypoth-
esis and an undesirable remnant of idealist metaphysics in the
science of physiology.29 The main problem identiﬁed by oppo-
nents pertained to the idea of adding a component of feeling or
awareness to the mere physiological fact of a central discharge
from the nervous system into the motor centres. In addition to
these anti-idealist objections, however, one could also contend
that with this complete reduction of the formal condition of self-
reﬂexive spontaneity to a sensation or feeling one reopens the
door towards inﬁnite regress. After all, if the subjective pole
of consciousness comes into being with the feeling of eﬀort,
than what or who generated the eﬀort? According to some, this
leads us right back into Hume’s Labyrinth. Frank (2007, 169), for
example, contends that “[t]hat which, according to the model,
should function as the criterion for whether an action is one’s
own, has no ownness to it and therefore . . . cannot function as
the criterion.” In conclusion, although the historical framework
presented in this analysis provides a fresh angle from which to
consider Helmholtz’s empirico-transcendentalism with respect
to the problem of diﬀerential consciousness, the degree towhich
he succeeded in evading the problems of circularity and inﬁnite
regress remains a matter of debate.
29Most notably see von Kries in his comments on Helmholtz’s 1856–66
Treatise; also see James (1890, 496–593). For a somewhat more recent sketch of
the historical debates on that topic, see Jeannerod (2006).
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